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Further to the letter of December 2020, endorsed by more than 5,000 judges and
prosecutors of the Member States, we, the representatives of Polish civil society
organisations and European scholars specialising in EU law and human rights,
are writing to you once again in connection with the worsening rule of law crisis in
Poland. We have now reached a stage where independent judges seeking to apply
EU law and the Court of Justice’s judgments are threatened with abusive criminal
charges and coercive measures. We urge you therefore to urgently adopt concrete
legal measures to prevent the further destruction of the rule of law in Poland.
In particular, we would like to ask you to immediately refer Poland to the Court
of Justice regarding the “Muzzle Law” and the functioning of the Disciplinary
Chamber, and to simultaneously submit a comprehensive application for
interim measures – with the aim of having them granted as soon as possible.
The content of such a request and its grounds are set out later in this letter.
The deadline set by the Commission in its additional reasoned opinion addressed to
the Polish government regarding the “Muzzle Law” and the suspended Disciplinary
Chamber passed at the end of February 2021. Even so, the Polish authorities have
not stopped systematically breaching EU law and ignoring the Court of Justice’s
rulings.
At the same time, Polish authorities have significantly and deliberately increased
their activities intended to produce irreversible legal effects and to organise a
permanent breach of EU requirements of judicial independence before the pending
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action in Case C-791/19 and the Commission’s expected action in the mentioned
case are decided by the Court of Justice.
Notwithstanding Poland’s requirement to suspend the operation of the Disciplinary
Chamber in disciplinary cases regarding judges, this body – which is not a “court”
within the meaning of EU and Polish law – is still unlawfully suspending Polish
judges in their official duties and authorising the prosecution of national judges on
criminal charges. Apart from the well-known decisions of the Disciplinary Chamber
to suspend Judges Pawe# Juszczyszyn, Beata Morawiec and Igor Tuleya, this body
is planning further actions in the immediate future. On 21 April 2021, the Disciplinary
Chamber is planning to decide on the detention and the use of coercive measures
against Judge Igor Tuleya in order to press criminal charges against him for the
content of his ruling. On the following day, this body will be dealing with the matter
of lifting the immunity of Judge Józef Iwulski, who is the President of the Labour and
Social Security Chamber of the Supreme Court, with the aim of preventing the Court
of Justice to decide on requests for preliminary ruling referred by this chamber.
Simultaneously, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, under the total control of the Minister
of Justice, has requested the Disciplinary Chamber to authorise criminal prosecution
and to suspend a number of judges of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court.
These include Judge W#odzimierz Wróbel, who received overwhelming support in
the recent elections of the First President of the Supreme Court, although the Polish
President decided to appoint another person, who was nominated to the Supreme
Court by the National Council of the Judiciary in its current unlawful membership.
Other judges of the Criminal Chamber, including its President, Judge Micha#
Laskowski, as well as the former First President of the Supreme Court, Judge
Ma#gorzata Gersdorf, are also targeted by the Public Prosecutor’s Office. As
reported in the media, the prosecution authorities intend to press criminal charges
against judges who decided to transfer disciplinary cases of advocates to the
Criminal Chamber rather then allowing their examination by the suspended
Disciplinary Chamber. It should be borne in mind that, having suspended the
functioning of this body, the Court of Justice also required Poland to refrain from
referring all cases to the Disciplinary Chamber before a panel whose membership
does not satisfy the requirements of independence. These requirements are
manifestly not met by any formations of this body.
Simultaneously, the Polish parliament is considering further amendments to the
Law on the Supreme Court, which are important from the point of view of its
independence. A number of its provisions are to come into force within 14 days of
the publication of this law in the official journal, including those which allow the Polish
President to arbitrarily appoint interim presidents of the Supreme Court’s chambers,
without the need to hold an election procedure in each chamber. This measure is
similar to the new provisions on the election of the First President of the Supreme
Court of 2020, which the Commission rightly raised in Poland’s chapter of its Rule
of Law Report of September 2020. The legislative process for this law is expected
to be completed in the coming days, which means that this act will be waiting for the
President’s signature and publication in the official journal.
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Additionally, the members of the Disciplinary Chamber, as well as the current
unlawfully appointed First President of the Supreme Court, have consistently
demanded that the said President of the Labour and Social Security Chamber
transfer the files of the cases in which that chamber requested the Court of Justice to
give preliminary rulings on the status of individuals appointed to the Supreme Court
in gross breach of the law following the nomination procedure before the National
Council of the Judiciary in its current membership. We would like to reiterate that the
current First President of the Supreme Court is also in this group.
Furthermore, on 28 April 2021, the Constitutional Tribunal – which is a body that
lacks independence according to the Commission’s own assessment – is to consider
a question of law referred to it by the Disciplinary Chamber the day after it was
suspended by the Court of Justice. The unlawfully composed Constitutional Tribunal
will pretend to have the jurisdiction to examine the constitutionality of Article 4(3)
TEU and Article 279 TFEU, insofar as they require a Member State to comply with
interim measures concerning the system and the functioning of the national judiciary.
These circumstances relate directly to the Commission’s recent infringement
procedure mentioned above. The continued functioning of the Disciplinary
Chamber and the unlawful appointment of its members, and other individuals
appointed to the Supreme Court at the request of the National Council of
the Judiciary in its current unlawful membership, severely threatens the
independence of Polish courts and will produce irreversible legal effects
resulting in a permanent breach of EU law and the requirements of the rule of
law.
The expected decision of the Disciplinary Chamber to allow for detention against
Judge Igor Tuleya may mark the first time in the European Union when force is
used against a national judge for the content of his ruling. The intention to press
criminal charges against judges, with the complicity of a body which patently does
not constitute a “court”, would exacerbate the “chilling effect” experienced by the
members of Poland’s judiciary and seriously undermine the effective and uniform
application of EU law by the Polish courts. Faced with the prospect of arbitrary
criminal or disciplinary sanctions, judges will be reluctant to apply EU law, in
particular the requirements related to effective judicial protection.
Decisions of the Disciplinary Chamber to waive immunity and to suspend numerous
judges of the Criminal Chamber and the Labour and Social Security Chamber
of the Supreme Court, including their presidents, will have equally irreparable
consequences and will mark the beginning of the end of mutual trust in respect
of Poland. In this situation, the current unlawfully appointed First President of the
Supreme Court will be able to decide, on her own, to transfer the files of pending
cases to two new chambers. This will mean that several preliminary references to
the Court of Justice of key importance to the entire EU legal order will be neutralised
and no longer relevant. We are convinced that the main purpose of the actions of
the prosecutor’s office against these judges is indeed to prevent both the Court
of Justice from dealing with those essential preliminary ruling questions and the
Supreme Court from applying already decided preliminary ruling cases. This risk
will be further increased by the outgoing amendments to the Law on the Supreme
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Court, which allow the Polish President to appoint interim presidents of the Supreme
Court’s chambers.
The expected outcome of these developments will be to block any possibility of
taking advantage of any mechanisms provided in EU law to examine the status
of individuals unlawfully appointed to the Supreme Court in gross breach of the
Polish Constitution and EU law. This will seriously exacerbate Poland’s rule of law
breakdown which has resulted, among other things, in the lack of respect for the
effective judicial protection and the requirements of the rule of law in proceedings
before Poland’s top court.
At the same time, the continued operation of the remaining solutions that are
challenged by the Commission in its infringement procedure undermine EU law.
The mere prospect of disciplinary and criminal sanctions for the content of judicial
decisions will exacerbate the “chilling effect” which we have already mentioned. The
exclusive jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Appeals and Public Affairs Chamber –
a body which suffers from the same legal flaws as the Disciplinary Chamber – in
cases regarding the status of individuals appointed to Polish courts at the request
of the National Council of the Judiciary in its current membership, in parallel with
the requirement to discontinue such proceedings, is resulting in tens of thousands
of decision existing in the Polish legal system which are issued by bodies which
flagrantly violate the EU criteria for effective judicial protection. The new provisions
requiring judges to disclose specific information about their non-professional
activities, in particular their membership in judicial associations, also aim to create
the “chilling effect” by stigmatising judges and restricting their ability to exercise their
fundamental rights. As currently drafted, these provisions are disproportionate and
incompatible with the right to respect for private life, freedom of association, and the
right to the protection of personal data as guaranteed by the Charter and the General
Data Protection Regulation.
For all these reasons, we urge you to refer the case to the Court of Justice
without more delay and to apply for a broad set of interim measures, even
before the Polish government submits its observations, pursuant to Article
160(7) of the Rules of Procedure – to avoid the usual dilatory tactics of the
Polish authorities. Only in this way will it be possible to stop the imminent
threat to the rule of law and to contain the crisis.
In this respect, it is essential that the proposed application for interim measures
covers as broad a set of issues as possible. Accordingly, we would like to ask you
to consider submitting a request to require the Republic of Poland, immediately and
pending the final judgment:
1) to suspend the application of the provisions of Article 110 § 1(1)(b) and (2) and
Article 110 § 2a and 2b of the Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts of 27
July 2001, as well as Article 3(5), Article 27 and Article 73 § 1 of the Law on the
Supreme Court of 8 December 2017 – which form the basis for the jurisdiction of the
Disciplinary Chamber in cases concerning judges;
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2) to suspend the application of the provisions of Article 42a § 1 and 2 and Article
107 § 1(2) and (3) of the Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts of 27 July
2001, as well as Article 29 § 2 and 3 and Article 72 § 1(2) and (3) of the Law on the
Supreme Court of 8 December 2017 – which prohibit the courts from examining the
authority of other judges or courts to adjudicate and provide for disciplinary sanctions
for judges for undertaking such an examination;
3) to take all necessary measures to ensure that the pending disciplinary and
criminal proceedings against judges, as well as investigations before the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings, regarding both the violation of Article 107 § 1(1)(2) and (3)
of the Law on the organisation of the ordinary courts of 27 July 2001 or Article 72 §
1(2) and (3) of the Law on the Supreme Court of 8 December 2017, as well as those
related to the content of judicial decisions – conducted before competent authorities
or courts – are suspended;
4) to refrain from allowing individuals appointed to the Supreme Court – including the
Disciplinary Chamber and the Extraordinary Appeals and Public Affairs Chamber –
on the motion of the National Council of the Judiciary formed in accordance with the
procedure established by the provisions of the Law of 8 December 2017 amending
the Law on the National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts to refer and
examine cases;
5) to take all necessary measures to ensure that the judges with respect to whom
the Disciplinary Chamber has authorised criminal prosecution or detention have the
opportunity to have these decisions examined by the Supreme Court composed of
judges other than those referred to in point 4, and in proceedings which satisfy the
requirements of effective judicial protection;
6) to take all necessary measures to ensure that information contained in the
declarations submitted by judges, as referred to in Article 88a § 1 of the Law on the
organisation of the ordinary courts of 27 July 2001, are not publicly available;
7) to inform the European Commission, no later than one month after being notified
of the order regarding the interim measures, and then regularly – every month –
thereafter, of all the measures it has adopted or plans to adopt in order to fully
comply with that order.
For obvious reasons, we do not have access to the documents from the pending
infringement procedure. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this will be one of the
most important cases ever brought before the Court of Justice in the history of the
European Union. We are also aware of the Commission’s long-standing policy of
referring only those cases where the Commission is certain of winning to the Court of
Justice. But we also know that, in its recent case-law, the Court of Justice confirmed
the extended scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, which now
covers a remarkably wide range of measures and practices of the Member States
that might jeopardise effective judicial protection and the rule of law. Instead of
always waiting for the Court of Justice to lead the way, the Commission must fulfil
its role as Guardian of the Treaties, must stop acting in a too little too late fashion,
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and finally face the reality that Poland has become the country which has dismantled
democracy and the rule of law the most in the world since 2015.
The requested application for interim measures must reflect this reality and the
existential threat to the functioning and future of the EU legal order. We do hope
that the Commission’s legal service is aware of the extreme gravity of the situation
in Poland and stands ready to argue accordingly. In any case, we remain at your
disposal should you require additional information on the points outlined above. We
once again urge you to act promptly and meaningfully.
What is at stake in this case is the independence of the whole of the judiciary in
Poland. More statements, dialogue and reports are not going to contain, let alone
solve Poland’s rule of law crisis. It is indeed no longer a crisis that Poland is facing
but a total breakdown in the rule of law which, in turn, represents a threat to the
interconnected legal order that underpins the European Union.
Yours faithfully,
Justice Defence Committee (KOS):
Amnesty International
Association of Judges “THEMIS”
Association pro memoriam prof. Zbigniew Ho#da
Civil Development Forum (FOR Foundation)
Free Courts
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights
Institute of Law and Society INPRIS
“Lex Super Omnia” Association of Prosecutors
Polish Judges’ Association “Iustitia”
Polish Association of Judges of Administrative Courts
Presidium of the Judges Cooperation Forum
Wiktor Osiaty#ski Archive
and
Cracow Institute of Criminal Law Foundation
“Defensor Iuris” Association of Attorneys-at-Law
Dr Vigjilenca Abazi, Maastricht University
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Professor Joana Covelo de Abreu, University of Minho
Professor Alberto Alemanno, HEC Paris
Professor Matej Avbelj, New University
Professor Asl# Ü. Bâli, UCLA School of Law
Professor Petra Bárd, Eötvös Lorand University, Central European University
Professor Samo Bardutzky, University of Ljubljana
Professor Gavin Barrett, University College Dublin
Dr Uladzislau Belavusau, T.M.C. Asser Institute
Professor Paul Blokker, University of Bologna
Professor Bojan Bugaric, University of Sheffield
Professor Antoine Buyse, Utrecht University
Dr Matthieu Burnay, Queen Mary University of London
Professor Ba#ak Çal#, Hertie School in Berlin
Professor Ramona Coman, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Dr John Cotter, Keele University
Dr Kati Cseres, University of Amsterdam
Dr Egl# Dagilyt#, Anglia Ruskin University
Dr Tom Gerald Daly, Melbourne School of Government
Professor Giacomo Di Federico, University of Bologna
Professor Peter Van Elsuwege, Ghent University
Dr Cassandra Emmons, Harvard University
Professor Iris Goldner Lang, University of Zagreb
Dr Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, University of Groningen
Dr Joelle Grogan, Middlesex University London
Professor Xavier Groussot, Lund University
Professor Michaela Hailbronner, University of Gießen
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Professor Gabor Halmai, European University Institute
Dr Daniel Hegedüs, The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Professor Christophe Hillion, University of Oslo
Professor Hristo Hristev, Sofia University
Professor R Daniel Kelemen, Rutgers University
Professor Jeff King, University College London
Professor Dimitry Kochenov, CEU Democracy Institute
Dr Constantinos Kombos, University of Cyprus
Professor Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, University of Gda#sk
Dr Kriszta Kovács, WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Jaka Kukavica, European University Institute
Dr Dilek Kurban, Hertie School
Professor Rui Lanceiro, University of Lisbon
Professor Rick Lawson, Leiden University
Professor Ronan McCrea, University College London
Professor Christoph Möllers, Humboldt University
Professor John Morijn, University of Groningen
Professor Jan-Werner Müller, Princeton University
Professor Tommaso Pavone, University of Oslo
Professor Laurent Pech, Middlesex University London
Professor Vlad Perju, Boston College Law School
Professor Thomas Perroud, Panthéon-Assas University (Paris II)
Professor Roman Petrov, National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
Professor Sébastien Platon, University of Bordeaux
Professor Ji#í P#ibá#, Cardiff University
Professor Daniel Sarmiento, Complutense University of Madrid
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Julian Scholtes, European University Institute
Professor Wojciech Sadurski, University of Sydney, University of Warsaw
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele, Princeton University
Professor Alessandra Silveira, University of Minho
Dr Rui Tavares, New York University
Dr Radosveta Vassileva, University College London
Professor Marlene Wind, University of Copenhagen
Professor Jan Wouters, KU Leuven
Professor Miros#aw Wyrzykowski, University of Warsaw
Professor Lorenzo Zucca, King’s College London
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